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ABSTRACT 
The  social  security  program  now provides  a constant  real 
benefit  throughout each retirees  lifetime.  This  paper  examines 
whether  total  welfare would rise if benefits  were lower  in early 
retirement  years (when most  individuals  have  some  saving  with 
which to finance  consumption)  and higher in later  years (when the 
uncertainty  of  survival  and  the  absence  of  actuarially  fair 
private  annuities  makes  the  availability  of  social  security 
benefits more important.) 
The analysis shows that  there  is  a  potentially  important 
difference  between  the  structure  of  benefits  that  would  be 
preferred  by the current  population  of  workers  and  retirees  and 
the structure  of benefits  that  would  maximize the  steady  state 
level  of social  welfare. This  difference  reflects  the  role of 
unintended  bequests. 
The provision  of higher  benefits  to older  retirees  reduces 
individually  optimal  savings  and  therefore  the  level  of 
unintended  bequests.  While those  bequests  may  have no value to 
the retirees,  they are clearly  of value to the  young  workers  who 
will  receive  those bequests.  More generally,  the system of level 
benefits raises  the steady state level  of the  capital  stock  and 
of total  real  income. 
The  present  paper provides  an explicit analysis of a case  in 
which  the current workers  want  benefits  to  increase  with  age 
while  the  social  security  system  that maximizes  steady state 
welfare would  provide higher  benefits  to  young retirees  than  to 
the very old. 
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* 
Martin Feldstein 
Although  individuals  csn save while  they  are working  to  finance 
consumption  during  their retirement  years, they  cannot purchase  actuarially 
fair  annuities  with  which to spread  their accumulated wealth  over an 
uncertain  retirement  period.  Because  insurance companies  cannot  know as 
much about individuals' health  and life expectancy  as the individuals 
themselves,  an  adverse  selection problem  leads  to the underprovision  of 
annuity  insurance.1  As a result,  individuals  are forced to leave 
involuntary  bequests  and to  consume  less during  their retirement  and 
preretirement  years  than  an  actuarial  fair  annuity would  permit. 
In contrast  to the limited voluntary  private  annuity market, 
compulsory  public  social  security  retirement  systems can  provide  actuarial 
fair  annuities.  This feature  is a potentially  important justification  for 
mandating  social security  retirement  benefits even though  the implicit 
return  on social security  is less than  the return on  private  investmenta.2 
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It is  perhaps  surprising  therefore  that  in  practice  the social 
security  program  provides each retiree with a real benefit  that is fixed 
for life.  It  seems at least plausible  that  the social security  program 
should  instead provide  a lower level of benefits  in  the early  retirement 
years  (when most individuals have  savings with  which  to  finance 
consumption)  and a higher  level  of  benefits  in  later years  (when  the 
uncertainty  of  survival  and the absence of  actuarial  fair private  annuities 
makes the availability  of social  security  benefits more important).  The 
present  paper  examines  this conjecture  and shows the types of conditions 
under  which it may be true. 
The paper  also  indicates  that there is a potentially  important 
difference  between  the structure  of  benefits  that  would  be preferred  by the 
current  population  of  workers  and  retirees  and the structure of benefits 
that  would  maximize  the steady  state level  of  social welfare.  This 
difference  reflects  the role  of unintended  bequests.  The provision  of 
higher  benefits  in old age (i.e., in the later  retirement  years)  reduces 
the amount  that rational  individuals will save for their old age.  This 
reduced  saving  implies a reduced level of unintended  bequests.  While those 
bequests  may have little or no  value  in  the eyes of  the retirees,  they  are 
clearly  of  value to the younger individuals who receive those bequests.  If 
the level  of  bequest  to be received  by those who are currently  alive 
reflects  the social  security benefit rules  that  existed in the past,  those 
who are currently  alive may favor a system  in which  benefits  rise  with age 
even  if everyone  would  prefer  to live in an economy in which  security 
benefits  are and previously  have  been  a constant  real annuity.  The present 
paper provides  an  explicit analysis of a  case in  which  the current workers 3 
want  benefits to increase with age while  the social  security  system  that 
maximizes  steady  state welfare would  provide higher  benefits  to young 
retirees  than to the very old. 
It is useful  to begin the analysis f  the optimal age distribution  of 
social security  benefits  by considering  the simple but extreme case in 
which  individuals  are completely  myopic:  they do no saving  and are 
therefore  completely  dependent  on  social security  benefits  for their 
retirement  consumption.  Since such  individuals  do not save,  there are no 
unintended  bequests  and therefore no  distinction  between  the optimal 
structure  of benefits  from  the vantage point  of retirees  and of  younger 
workers.  The socially  optimal  structure of benefits  maximizes  the welfare 
of  retirees.  Section  1 discusses  the optimal age profile  of  social 
security  benefits  in such  an  economy. 
Section  2 then goes to the opposite  extreme and considers  the 
structure  of benefits  that would  be preferred  by a young  worker  who is a 
rational  life-cycle  saver but who ignores the value  of  the unintended 
bequests  received  by the next  generation.  The structure  of  benefits  that 
maximizes  the utility  of such  an individual  is shown  to depend  in  a very 
simple way on the implicit  rate  of return  on social  security,  the return  on 
private  saving, and the probability  that young  retirees  survive  to old age. 
It is shown  that  this  solution  also  corresponds  to  the benefit  structure 
that  maximizes  the  welfare  of all those alive  at a point  in  time. 
The third section  derives the socially optimal benefit  structure  when 
the effect  of the benefit  structure  on the value  of the unintended  bequests 
received  by the next  generation  of  workers is explicitly  recognized.  The 
analysis  shows  that recognizing  the value of unintended  bequests  can 4 
reverse  the desired age structure  of  benefits.  The desirability  of 
providing  an  actuarially  fair annuity can  be outweighed  by the inefficiency 
of social security  as a savings vehicle when  the excess  savings are 
transferred  to  the next generation  through unintended  bequests. 
The analysis  in  this paper  is restricted  to extremely  simple  models in 
order  to separate  the effects  of  imperfect annuity  markets,  individual 
myopia,  and the value of  unintended  bequests.  A  realistic  analysis  of  the 
optimal age structure  of  social  security benefits  would  have to recognize 
that  the extent  of economic  myopia varies  in  the population3  and that  soae 
bequests  are intended.4  A  more complete diacussion  would  also consider the 
character  of  private  group pension  annuities,  the possibility  of  means 
testing additional  benefits  for the very  old5,  of  a funded  social security 
system  instead of the current pay-as-you-go  approach,  etc. 
1.  The Optimal  Annuity  Structure with  Complete Myopia 
The economy examined  in this paper  is an extension  of the overlapping 
generations  model  first  developed by  Samuelson  (1958).  Instead  of  the 
Samuelsonian  two-period  framework,  individuals are assumed here to work  for 
two period  and then  retire  for either one or two periods.  All individuals 
are alike  and each  has a probability p of surviving  to the second 
retirement  period.  The population  grows at rate n per period  and wages 
grow  at rate  g. 
If  the number  of new retirees at time t is R, the number  of  older 
retirees who survived  from  the previous generation  of new retirees  is 
pRtl.  The social  security  program  pays  benefits  of b1 
to the younger 
retirees at time  t and 
b2 
to the older retirees at time  t. S 
All workers  at each  point  in  time are paid the same  wage, w. 
If  the 
total number  of  workers at  time t is denoted L  and the social  security  tax 
rate is 9,  the social  security  tax collections  are 
Tt 
— 9  The pay- 
as-you-go  nature  of the social  security program  implies  the budget 
constraint: 
(1)  blt Rt + b2  pEtl 
— 9wL 
To focus  on  the optimal age structure  of  the annuity,  I will  assume 
that the socisl  security  tax rate (9) and therefore  total social  security 
benefits  (Tt) 
sre fixed.  Since  individuals  are myopic and therefore  do no 
saving, the appropriate  welfare criterion  in  this section  csn be written  as 
a function  of the retirees'  consumption  only. 
Each individual's  utility during  retirement  will  be written  in  the 






is consumption  during  the first 
retirement  period  (i.e.,  the third period  of  life)  end 
c4 is the 
consumption  during  the second  period  of retirement  if the individual 
survives  to have that  consumption.  I tske the relevant  measure  of  social 
welfare  in each  period  to be the sum of the utilities  of the retirees alive 
in that  period  (since  the utility of the myopic workers  is independent  of 
the structure  of the retirement  benefits): 
(2)  — 
Rt  u(c3)  +  pR1  v(C) 
Since  individuals  do no  saving, all retirement  consumption  is financed 
by social  security:  c3t 
— b1 and c4 
— b2.  The optimal design  of the 
social security  benefits is then equivalent  to maximizing 6 
(3)  — Rt  u(b1) 
+ pRtl  v(b2), 
subject  to the government  budget  constrsint  given  by equation  (1).  It 
follows  immediately  that  u' — v' at the optimal levels of  benefits.  Thus 
if the two utility  functions  are identical,  the optimal benefits  of young 
*  *  6 
retirees  and older  retirees  are equal  in each  period: b1 
—  b2. 
Since real  wages  are rising at rate  g per period,  the common  level of 
benefit  is also increasing  at rate g per period.  The equality  of  benefits 
of the younger  and older  retirees at each  point in time therefore  means 
that  the optimal  level  of each  individual's own benefits  increases  at rate 
g between  the early  retirement  period  and the late retirement  period. 
2.  The Optimal  Annuity  Structure  for Rational  Egoists:  The Initial 
Retirees 
The present  section  drops  the assumption  that all individuals  are 
completely  myopic  in favor  of  the alternative  extreme assumption  that 
everyone  ia a rational  life-cycle  saver.  To show  the importance  of 
unintended  bequests,  the analysis  assumes that the individuals  are 
"egoists" who care only  about  their own  utility  and  who give  no weight  to 
the bequests  received  by the next  generation.  Since the analysis  in this 
section  completely  ignores  the effect  of  social security  benefits  on 
bequests  received,  it represents  the appropriate  analysis  for the "initial" 
generation  of  retirees.  The results of this section  can then  be compared 
with those of section  3 in  which the individual utility  criterion  reflects 
the effect  of the age structure  of  social  security benefits  on the value  of 
the unintended  bequests  that  result  from premature  death,  i.e., in which 
the individual  entering  the labor force "chooses"  the social security benefit  structure  knowing  that it  will affect the bequests  that  he receives 
as as well as the expected  value  of the bequests  that  he will  make. 
Although  the current criterion  ignores the effect  of the social 
security  benefit  structure  on the bequests  that are made,  the individual's 
budget  constraint  does  depend  on the bequests  that he received  during  his 
own preretirement  years.  More specifically,  the analysis  now assumes  that 
each individual  chooses  s psth  of  desired consumption  levels  based  on his 
wage income,  inherited bequests  and social  security benefits  that  maximizes 
expected utility.  This consumption  path  implies the accumulation  of  assets 
during  working  years  which, together  with  the social security  benefits, 
finances  consumption  during  retirement.  If  the individual  dies at the end 
of  the first period  of  retirement,  those assets  are bequeathed.  In 
deciding his own path of  consumption,  the egoistic  individual  assigns no 
value to those unintended  bequest.  No  private annuities  are available. 
To derive  explicit  results,  I will  now adopt  the log-linear  utility 
specification7  used in the social  security models of Feldstein  (1985, 1987) 
and  posit that individuals  who will retire in period  t maximize 
(4)  Ut 
— ln c1,_2 
+ ln 
c2...1 
+ ln c3 
+ ' ln c4+1 
subject  to the individual's  lifetime budget  constraint 
(5)  [  (l_O)w_2 
+ Bt2 
— 









where  is the bequest  received  when  the individual  is a young  worker  in 
period  t-2.  Although  an  individual  can  borrow  or lend  to transfer S 
resources  between  periods,  en  individual  cannot  leave  a negative bequeat; 
planned  consumption  in  the final period  must therefore be not less than  the 
social security  benefit  (c4 t+l  b  t+l  If  this condition  is satisfied 
(an assumption  that  will  be verified  later), it  follows  directly that  the 
individual's  optimal  consumption plan is: 
(6)  :  t+s—3 
— pk(l:r)5_l 






where  k—l for s-'4 and k  — 0  for the previous periods. 
Substituting  these optimal consumption  levels  into the lifetime 
utility  function  of equation  4 and collecting  similar  terms shows  that 
(7)  Ut — 
A1 
+ (3+p) ln 
{(l-e)wt2 
[l+(l+g)/(l+r)]  + 3t-2 
+ 
b1 /(l+r)2  + b2 
where  A1 depends  on p and r but not on  the benefits,  bequest  or tax rate. 
The individual's  preferred  benefit  structure maximizes U  subject to 
the government  budget  constraint  that  equates the total benefits paid at 
time t to the available  revenue: 
(8)  bi  Rt  + 
b2t  Rtl 
—  9  wL 
and to the steady  state path requirement  that each type of  benefit 
increases  over time  at the same rate as wages  (and  thus that  h2+1 
— 9 
(l+g).)  Dividing  each  term in equation  8 by the number  of new retirees  Rt 
implies that  the budget  constraint  can  be  written: 




To focus on the optimal age structure  of  benefits,  9  (and therefore 
total benefits)  is taken  as fixed.  With  b2 
— 
b2  (1 + g),  maximizing 
of equation  7 subject to the government budget  constraint  is equivalent 
to maximizing 
(10)  bi 
+ [(l+g)/(l+r)Jb2 
subject  to equation  9.  Since  (9)  and (10) are both linear  in bit 
and 
b2t 
it follows directly  that  the optimum  is a corner  solution  in which  all of 
the benefits  are paid either  to new retirees or to  older  retirees but not 
to  both. 
More specifically,  individual  utility is an increasing  function  of 
if (l+g)/(l+r) C p/(l+n)  and a decreasing  function of blt if (l+g)/(l+r) > 
p/(l+n).  Since both  benefits  must  be  non-negative,  (l+g)/(l+r)  < p/(l+n) 
implies  that the preferred  social security program would  be a lump sum to 
new retirees with  no benefits  to older retirees,  Conversely,  if 
(l+g)/(l+r) > p/(l+n),  the preferred  program would  psy no benefit  to new 
retirees  and a lump sum to those who survive to the second  period. 
To understand  this result, note that the key inequality  can be 
reststed  as a comparison  of  the survival probsbility p and the "efficiency 
of social  security,"  x — (l+n)(l+g)/(l  +r).  This term can be characterized 
as the efficiency  of social  security  becsuse  it compares  the implicit 
return  on social  security  [(l+n)(l+g)] to the return  earned  on private 10 
assets (l+r).8  Previous analysis  (e.g., Feldstein  (1985)) has emphasized 
that  sinte  social  security  is inefficient  in  the sense that x  < 1,  a social 
security  program  is justified  only to the extent  that the provision  of 
benefits  to those myopic  individuals who would  otherwise  save too little 
outweighs  the losses  to the rational  life cyclers who are forced  to 
sacrifice  a return  of  I + r in exchange  for a return  of (l+n)(l+g). 
In  the present  context  in which  the size of the overall  social 
security  program  is fixed  and in  which  all individuals are rational  life 
cyclers,  the comparison  of x and  p indicates whether  the gain from  social 
security's  ability to  provide  a fair annuity  outweighs  the loss due to its 
lower  rate  of  return.  If  x C p,  the return  on social  security  is so low 
that  individuals  are better  off receiving  a lump sum  social  security 
benefit  when they retire with  no second period  benefit at  all.  Another  way 
of stating  this is to note  that  x <p  is equivalent  to (l+g)  (1-i-n)  <  p(l+r), 
i.e.,  the return  provided  by the social  security annuity  [(l+g)(l+n)] is 
less than the return  from  private saving  reduced by the mortality 
probability  Ip(l+r)  1. 
In the alternative  case, the low return  on the social  security  annuity 
is nevertheless  great  enough  to exceed  the expected  return  on  private 
saving:  (l+g)(l+n)  > p (l+r) or x > p.  In  this caae,  the preferred  social 
security  program  pays the benefits  only to those who survive to the second 
period  of  retirement. 
A  numerical  example will indicate the nature  of this comparison. 
Assume  for simplicity  that younger  retirees are age 70 (i.e., the midpoint 
of the decade  65 to  75) and that  older retirees  are 85 years  old.  For 
American  males,  the probability  that a 70 year  old will survive to age 85 11 
is 0.49.  Using the average annual growth  rates  of  population  (1.4 percent) 
and real  wages (2.3 percent)  for the three decades from  1950 through 1980, 
the 15 year return  on social  security is (l+g)(l+n) — 1.73.  If  the real 
rate of return  available  on  savings is  six percent per year, for the 15 
year period  l+r — 2.40  and the efficiency  of social  security  is x — 
1.73/2.40 — 0.72  and therefore substantially  greater than  the survival 
probability  of 0.49.  In this  case, benefits  should  be postponed  and given 
only to the older  retirees.  If  the return  on  private  savings is taken  to 
be the pretax  real return  on  nonresidential  cspital or  approximately  11.5 
percent (see  Feldstein,  Poterbs and  Dicks-Miresu,  1983), so that 1 + r — 
5.12  and the efficiency  of  social  security  is only  0.34, the basic 
inefficiency  of social  security dominates  the effect of  providing  a fair 
annuity  (x C p)  and therefore  that benefits  should  be paid  only to the 
younger  retirees. 
Two comments  on  the results of  this section are in  order.  First, 
paying  all of the benefits  to  the older retirees could  csuse  the 
consumption  path implied by equation  6 to violate  the constraint  that 
c4 t+l ￿ 
b2  t+l' i.e.,  that the potential bequest  at the end of  the first 
retirement  period  must  be non-negative.  If this constraint  is binding,  it 
must  be imposed  explicitly  and the optimal consumption  path  and optimal 
benefits recalculated.  Doing  so will imply sn interior solution  for the 
two  benefit  levels:  bi  >  0 and  b2 t+1 
> 0.  It can never  imply that  all 
of the benefits  should  be paid  during  the first retirement  period. 
Second,  it should  be emphasized  that the extreme result  that it  might 
be optimal  to give  no benefit  in  one of  the two periods reflects  the lack 
of sny myopia  in  the population.  Whenever  some individuals  are omplete1y 12 
myopic,  it is  necessarily  optimal  to pay benefits  in both  periods. 
Although  any realistic  analysis  of  the optimal age structure  of  benefits 
would  have to deal  with  myopia  as well  as imperfect  annuity  markets,  the 
basic  analytic  significance  of balancing  the imperfect annuity  market  and 
the inefficiency  of  social  security  is clearer if myopia  is ignored. 
3.  Endogenous  Bequests  and the Optimal  Steady  State Age Structure  of 
Benefits 
The results  derived  in  section 2 show  the age structure  of benefits 
thst  maximizes  the welfare  of a representative  worker  of the initial 
retiree generation.  It  does not recognize  that  the bequests  received  by 
each  generation  of  workers  depends on the age structure  of the social 
security  benefits  anticipated and received  by a  previous  generation  of 
retirees.  Promising  a  high level of  benefits  to  older  retirees  reduces 
their optimal  saving  for their very old age and therefore  reduces  the 
unintended  bequests  that are made  by those who die at the end of their 
first  retirement  period.  A social welfare  function  that  properly 
recognizes  that  the  welfare  of each  cohort  is affected  in this way  by the 
benefit  structure  faced  by previous  cohorts will imply  that the optimal 
level of benefit  paid to  older  retirees is generally  less than (although 
possibly  equal  to) that  derived in the previous  section. 
The present  section extends  the analysis  of section  2 by explicitly 
recognizing  the effect  of  the benefit  structure on the level  of unintended 
bequests.  It  shows  that in  a very simple model with rational  life  cycle 
savers  (no myopia),  complete egoism  (no altruistic  bequests)  and 
logarithmic  utility  functions,  the age structure  of benefits  that  maximizea 
steady  state  utility always  gives all of the  benefits  to the younger 13 
retirees  unless  social  security  is fully efficient  (x a  l).  Thus in  this 
case  the unintended  bequests  that result  form  the payment  of  early benefits 
always  outweigh  the gain  from  providing  an  improved annuity  as  long as 
private  saving has a higher  return  than  social  security  (x < 1).  The key 
reason  for this difference  is that the total return to saving  for the older 
age is now recognized  as being  received  by someone -- either the surviving 
retiree or the deceased  retiree's  heir -- and  therefore  as long  as the 
return  on that  saving  exceeds  the return  on  social  security  (x  <  1), it 
increases  steady  state welfare  to have  the funds invested  in real  assets. 
To  analyze  this problem,  I assume  that  the unintended  bequests  made at 
time t are divided  equally among  all of the young  workers  alive at time 
A  worker  who would  have  been  an  older retiree at time t but who dies 
prematurely  leaves a  bequest  equal  to c4 
— b2t.  the excess of  planned 
consumption  over  the social -security  benefit that  would have  been received 
had the individual  lived.  Since  the proportion  1—p of  those  in  this age 
cohort  do die prematurely  and there are (l+n)3 as many  young  workers  as 
there  are members  of the original  cohort of older retirees,  the bequest 
received  by each  young  worker  is: 
-3 
(11)  Bt 
— (l+n)  (l-p) (c4 
- 
b2  ). 
The  utility  of  the  representative  individual who retires at time t is 
given  by 
(12)  Ut 
— in c1,_2 
+ in c2..1  + in c3  +  P  in c4+1 
Equation  6, which states  the individual consumption  choices as functions  of 
wage income, benefits  and received bequests,  implies: 14 
(13) c+1 





Noting  that equation  11 holds  at  every point  in  time and  using the fact 
that  all per capita  amounts grow  at rate  g along  the equilibrium  path 
implies 
(14)  — (1+n13 (1p)(c+i 
- b21)(l+gY3. 
Equations  13 and 14 can  be combined  to eliminate  and therefore  to 
restate  consumption  as a function of  wage income and  benefit  rules.  Note 
that the individual  utility maximization  decision  that  produces  13 is 
egoistic  and gives no weight  to the bequests  that might  accrue  to future 
generations.  The relation  between benefits  and consumption  that  works 
through bequests  is an  equilibrium property  of  the process  and  not of 
individual  preferences  for making  bequests. 
Equations  13 and 14  together  imply 
*  3  (3+p)x 
I 
(15)  c4 t+l 
= (l+r)  3  1(l-O)w2tl+(l+g)/(1+r)] 
(3+p)x 





(1-P)]  }.  (1+r)  x 
More generally,  the other  consumption  terms  can be derived using  the 
relative values  indicated by equation 6 and  by the fact  that  along  the 
equilibrium  path c*k 
= g)lC c*. 
Thus 15 
s-i  3-s  k 3 
(16) c  (l+r)  (l+g) 
{(1-e)w2rl+(l+)/l+r)] 
+ b1(l+r52 
(3+p)x  p(l p) 
+ 
b2tl(l÷rY3[l-(l-P)x3)} 
where  k — 1  for s —  4  and  k — 0  otherwise. 
It is clear from equation 16 that  all of  the  at time t are 
proportional  to the expression  in brackets  (which is independent  of  s) and 
that  they  differ  only  by the numerator  of the term  that  precedes  the 
bracketed  expression  (which  is independent of  the age structure  of 
benefits).  Choosing  bi 
and b2 
to  maximize jy c  subject to the budget 
constraint  - 
(17)  bit + pb2  (1 +  n)1 — constant 
therefore  maximizes  all the c  at  time t.  This follows because b  and  st  lt 
b2  influences  the ce's only through the individuals'  lifetime budget 
constraints. 
The representative  utility function of equation  12 is maximized  by 
maximizing  the cst.  The optimal steady  state  age structure  of  benefits  is 
therefore  obtained  by  maximizing  equation  16 subject to the  budget 
constraint  of equation  17 and the equilibrium path  condition  that b2+i 
— 
(l+g)b2. 
Combining  16 and 17 to eliminate b2  yields 
1  —3 
(18)  c*  —  A  +  p — x[l — (l—p)x  b 
s,t  at  t  3  2  I  it 
j p(3+p)x  — p  (l—p)  j 16 
where A  does  not depend  on b1. 
It follows immediately  that  stesdy 
state social  welfare  is maximized  by setting b1 
— 0  if  the expression  in 
brackets  is negative and by setting b2  0 (and therefore  maximizing  the 
feasible value  of b1) 
if  the expression  in brackets  is poaitive. 
Consider  first  the case in which  social security  is fully efficient, 
i.e.  ,  in which x — 1.  The numerator  of  the expression  is 18 to their 
identically  zero and steady  atate welfare is not affected  by the age 
structure  of the social benefits. 
In the more  relevant  case  in  which  social  security  ia inefficient 
(x < 1), equation  18 implies that  it is  optimal to pay all of the benefits 
to new retirees:  b2t 
— 0  and b1  >  0.  To  demonstrate  this,  assume  first 
that the denominator  of the bracketed  expresaion  is positive.  Note  that at 
p=O the numerator  equals —x[l—x3] > 0 and at  p—1 the numerator  equals  l—x 
>  0.  Since  the value  of  the numerator  decreases  monotonically  with  p (at 
rate  1 —  x2),  the numerator  is  positive at  all feasible values  of 
0 ￿  p ￿  1.  It follows therefore  that steady  atate  aocial welfare  is 
maximized  by setting b2t —  0  and  having  the highest  value of b1  compatible 
with the government  budget  constraint. 
For any given value  of  p, a low enough value  of x makes  the 
denominator  negative.  Although  a literal interpretation  of equation  18 
would  suggest  that in  thia case blt 
should be zero,  this is a false 
conclusion.  It is clear from  the economics  of  the problem  that reducing  x 
(i.e.  ,  making social  security less efficient)  increases  the advantage  of 
giving  benefits  earlier.  This  can  be seen  in equation  18 since,  as long  as 
the denominator  of the bracketed  expressive  is positive,  the value  of the 
bracketed  expression  as a whole  varies  inversely with x.  When x gets below 17 
a certain critical  value,  the sign  of the denominator  changes as the effect 
of b1 
on consumption  and steady  state welfare  appear  (falsely)  to he 
reversed.  In  fact, when x drops below  that critical value  the system 
becomes  unstable  in the sense  that  the shift of  benefits  from  the older 
aged to  the younger aged causes  the ratio of inherited  wealth  to  labor 
income to  increase  over  time  without  limit.  In such  a situation  there  is 
no steady  state  level of consumption  and equation  18 is invalid.  It 
remains  true  however  that  b2 
— 0  and b1  > 0  maximizes  the log-run path  of 
consumption  and  social  welfare. 
It should  be emphasized  that the results of this section refer to  the 
benefit  structure  that maximizes  the steady state level  of social  welfare. 
The analysis  of section  2 showed  that the welfare of the initial generation 
will  be increased  by paying  benefits  to older retirees  whenever  p < x. 
Thus the optimal  permanent  structure  of  benefits  is unambiguous  only  when 
p < x.  In the reverse  case  (when social  security is efficient  enough  to 
outweigh  the lack of private  annuities)  the optimal permanent  structure of 
benefits  requires  an explicit  intertemporal  social welfare  function 
balancing  the utilities  of  different  generations.  A  high enough  discount 
rate  makes  such  an intertemporal  welfare  function equivalent  to  maximizing 
the welfare  of  the initial generation.  As the discount  rate declines,  the 
optimal  structure  of benefits  shifts in  the direction  of increased benefits 
for younger  retirees.  See Feldstein  (1985) for an explicit  example of  the 
intertemporal  welfare  function  in this  context. 
More generally,  the very strong result  that paying  benefits  to younger 
retirees  maximizes  steady  state welfare reflects  the very special 
assumption  that  everyone  is a rational life-cycle  saver.  Introducing 18 
myopia  in  the population  would  make it optimal to  provide benefits  for the 
older aged as well.  What  the current analysis brings  out, however,  is that 
taking  into  account  the effect  on  bequests  of  the age structure  of  benefits 
reduces the ratio  of the optimal benefit  of older  retirees  to  the optimal 
benefit  of younger  retirees. 
4.  Concluding  Comment 
This paper  has begun  an  exploration of the important  issue  of how 
social security  benefits  should  vary  with  the age of the recipient  in an 
economy with imperfect  annuity markets.  Three formal results  are derived. 
(1) When everyone  is myopic  and has the same utility  function,  all 
retirees  should  receive the same benefit at each  point  in time.  In an 
economy  in which  real  wages  rise with  time, benefits  rise as the individual 
ages. 
(2) Egoistic  rational  life-cyclers  in  the initial generation  of 
retirees  (whose  inheritances  are unaffected  by the structure  of  social 
security)  prefer  to postpone  benefits  until  their later retirement  years  if 
and  only if the "efficiency"  of social security  (the implicit  return on 
social  security  relative  to  the return  on  private investments)  is high 
enough  relative  to the probsbility of surviving  from  initial retirement  to 
older  age.  When the "efficiency" of social security  is  low,  they prefer 
tenefits to be paid immediately upon  retirement. 
(3) Looking  beyond  the initial generation  of retirees  and taking into 
account  the effect  of  social  security benefits  on  the bequests  to future 
generations  implies  that steady  state utility  is maximized  by paying 
benefits  only to young retirees since shifting benefits  to an  earlier 19 
period  increeses  saving  and therefore  unintended  bequests  and the aggregate 
capital stock. 
Because  the models  analyzed  here  are very simple,  the results  are only 
of suggestive  and  heuristic  value.  The problem  deserves further  analysis 
with more realistic models.  Such  analysis would  recognize  the existence  of 
imperfect  annuity markets  (rather than  assuming  that no private  annuities 
exist) and of  private  group pension  annuities  that  are fixed  in  nominal 
terms.  The role of  individual  myopia  would  be specifically  incorporated. 
The implications  of  imperfect  annuity  markets  and unintended  bequests  for 
the optimal  size of  the social  security program  and for the desirability  of 
means  testing  should  also be explored. 20 
Footnotes 
1.  On the absence of actuarial  fair annuities,  see Friedman  and tJarshawsky 
(1985a, l985b).  In  practice  individuals may also not buy annuities  because 
of their lack of  understanding  of  annuities  or an  irrational  fear  of 
"betting"  on a long life. 
2.  See Feldatein  (1985)  for an  analysis  that shows that  it may  be optimal 
to have  no social  security  in an  economy in  which  the implicit  return  on 
social  security  is low even  though  individuals  save too little privately 
for their  own old age. 
3.  Feldatein  (1985) uses two different models  of  partial myopia  to  discuss 
the optimal  level of social  security benefits.  In one model,  all 
individuals  are "partially  myopic" and give less than  the full  weight  to 
future  utility.  In  the alternative  model, a fraction  of  the population  is 
completely  myopic  while everyone else is a fully rational  life-cycle  saver. 
4.  Even  the distinction  between intended and unintended  bequests  is 
ambiguous  when younger  individuals  do not know  what their income will  be 
later in life.  See Feldatein  (1988). 
5.  Feldatein  (1987) discussed  the conditions  under  which a means  tested 
social security  program  is preferable  to a universal  program. 
6.  Although  it is of course possible  to argue that  differences  in  the 
utility  function  imply a different benefit  structure,  it is not clear  in 
which direction  this points.  Younger retirees may  have a higher  marginal 
utility  of consumption  at emch level of spending because  they are healthier 
and therefore  able to  engage in a  broader range  of  activities. 
Alternatively,  they older retirees may have  a higher  marginal utility  of 
consumption  at each level of  spending because  they have  higher  fixed  costs 21 
for medical  care and other personal  services.  While  recognizing both 
possibilities,  the present analysis proceeds  on the assumptions  that both 
utility  functions  are the same.  Note that even  if  the individual  discounts 
second  period  utility,  the social welfare function  reflects  utility at a 
point in time  and therefore  should  not incorporate such  a discount. 
7.  The basic  results  derived here are valid  for any homothetic  utility 
function.  Equations  6 and 7 show  that maximizing  lifetime utility  is 
equivalent  to maximizing  the present value  of lifetime resources  since 
utility  depends additively  on  consumption  and consumption  is each period  is 
proportional  to the present value  of  lifetime  resources,  a  property  of  any 
homothetic  utility  function. 
8.  Note that an  "inefficient  social  security  system  (x < 1)  corresponds  to 
an economy  that is dynamically  efficient  in  the traditional  sense. 
9.  The analysis  here is in  terms of  the utility of a representative 
individual  in  the steady  state.  The analysis  is easily  shown  to be 
formally  equivalent  to maximizing  the sum of all of  the utilities  of 
everyone  alive at a point  in time  if  the additively  separable  individual 
utility  functions  are given  the necessary  cardinal  interpretation.  A 
complete  intertemporal  utility function requirea  aggregating  the utilities 
of the "initial  generation" whoae  inheritances  are unaffected  by the choice 
of the age structure  of social  security benefits  and the subsequent 
generationa  whose  inheritances  depend  on  the age structure  of social 
security  benefits;  this issue is discussed  further at the end of  the 
current  section. 22 
10.  A  model  that  recognized  that  only  some workers  in each  generation 
receive bequests  would lead  to stochastic  distributions  of bequests  and of 
consumption  among the individuals  of each  age cohort.  Because of 
diminishing  marginal utility,  the unequal distribution  of  bequests  would 
reduce  the welfare  value of bequest  (relative to the current  model). 
Recognizing  the effect  of  the benefit  structure on bequests  would  therefore 
imply  s smaller increase  in  the optimsl level of benefits  of  younger 
retirees  thsn  when  all are sssumed to receive equal bequests. 
11.  This implies that  the results of  this section also hold for any 
homothetic  utility  function. 23 
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